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STRUCTURING MEXICAN EXPORTS
TO THE UNITED STATES: A
CHECKLIST OF OBJECTIVES,
PROBLEMS, AND STRATEGIES
UNDER UNITED STATES LAW*
Ewell E. Murphy, Jr.**
1. Objective: To the extent feasible, insulate the Mexican manufac-
turing enterprise from the risks of the U.S. market.
(a) Problem: Commercial obligations and general tort liability.
Strategy: The Mexican manufacturing enterprise forms a
special-purpose export subsidiary and exports exclusively
through it. All commercial obligations relevant to the U.S.
market and all operations within the U.S. market are those
of the export subsidiary, not the Mexican manufacturing
parent.
Comment:
Essential to such structuring are clear and well-considered
contracts-both between manufacturing parent and export
subsidiary and between the subsidiary and its distributors,
dealers, consignees, and customers in the U.S.-for the sale
of the exported goods.
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** B.A., LL.B., University of Texas, D. Phil., Oxford University, England. Mr. Murphy
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Two resources are particularly useful in the preparation of
such contracts. One is Incoterms (I.C.C. Publication No.
350 (1980)), the International Chamber of Commerce's rules
for the interpretation of basic trade terms (F.O.B., C.I.F.,
etc.). The second is the Vienna Convention on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/18, Annex
I (1980)). The adherence of Mexico to the Convention is
not effective until January 1, 1989, and the adherence of
the U.S. is subject to the reservation that the Convention
will not automatically apply, by rules of private international
law, between a U.S. resident and the resident of a non-
adhering nation.
Nevertheless, the Convention may be incorporated by ref-
erence in Mexico-U.S. contracts or usefully consulted as a
check-list for their provisions.
Even the most careful structuring may fail to insulate the
Mexican manufacfuring parent from all of the liabilities
incurred by its export subsidiary. Although by the middle
of the Nineteenth Century the United States had generally
moved to the principle of limited liability for corporate
enterprise, the subsequent emergence of corporate groups,
typically a parent corporation or holding company with
separately incorporated subsidiaries, led to a reassessment
of that principle.
In many fact situations, courts are now willing to "pierce
the veil" of corporate.insulation that limits the liability of
a parent corporation for acts of its subsidiary. This result
has been rationalized on the theory that the subsidiary is
merely the "alter ego" or "agent" of the parent. The growth
of such veil-piercing theories has coincided with the devel-
opment of product liability law, in which manufacturers of
dangerous products are held accountable by strict liability,
regardless of the degree of care they exercised and indepen-
dently of traditional causation rules.
Veil-piercing and product liability are put to their most
severe test in cases that seek to impose liability on nonres-
ident foreign parent corporations for acts performed, or
products manufactured, locally by their resident subsidiaries.
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An excellent survey of this rapidly developing area of law
is Blumberg, Corporate Groups and Enterprise Liability:
Procedural and Substantive Issues Pertaining to the Liability
of Multinational Corporations for the Activities of Subsid-
iaries, in Private Investors Abroad: Problems and Solutions
10-1 (1986). For aspiring architects of corporate insulation
his conclusions are daunting: "The earlier view that a sub-
sidiary corporation is a separate legal entity distinct from
its parent for purposes of jurisdiction is slowly yielding to
the view that the parent of a corporate group may be subject
to jurisdiction because of its subsidiary's activities within
the forum where the subsidiary's operations are economi-
cally integrated with the operations of the corporate group
and are under some group direction." Id. at 10-18. "With
jurisdictional disputes involving foreign-based multinational
enterprises accelerating the process, the movement of the
law in the area of jurisdiction is from an emphasis on legal
relationships to an emphasis on economic relationships."
Id. at 10-24.
(b) Problem: Amenability to lawsuit.
Example: Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sections
17.041-.045 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1988) (Texas Long-Arm
Statute).
Strategy I: To the extent feasible, the Mexican manufactur-
ing parent avoids all activity in the U.S. that could subject
it to the jurisdiction of U.S. (state or federal) courts.
To the extent feasible, the export subsidiary limits its activ-
ities and contractual commitments in the U.S. in such
,manner that it is subject to litigation only in selected states,
ideally only states where the export subsidiary has obtained
a Certificate of Authority and consequently has designated
a local agent for the service of process.
Comment:
Mexican, exporters are invariably shocked to learn how
litigious the U.S. is, and how jurisdictionally vulnerable
defendants are to its courts.
The cited Texas Long-Arm Statute, for instance, deems a
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foreign corporation to be "doing business" in Texas, and
consequently subject to suit in Texas, if the foreign corpo-
ration, (1) "contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas
resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole
or in part in this state," (2) "commits a tort in whole or
in part in this state," or (3) "recruits Texas residents,
directly or through an intermediary located in [Texas], for
employment inside or outside this state." Id. § 17.041.
In the few reported cases that dealt with foreign corporate
exporters to Texas, preliminary sales operations and spot
intrastate sales of detained goods, but not export sales made
pursuant to sporadic local sales solicitation, have been held
sufficient to support local jurisdiction. Lone Star Import,
Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961);
David v. Asano Bussan Co., 212 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1954);
and AMCO Transworld Inc. v. M/V Bambi, 257 F. Supp.
215 (S.D. Tex. 1966). Cases that sustained local jurisdiction
in the analogous situation of interstate sales to Texas have
considered it jurisdictionally significant that the seller main-
tained a sales representative in Texas, negotiated or con-
cluded sale contracts in Texas, or performed sales-related
functions in Texas. Acme Engineers, Inc. v. Foster Engi-
neering Co., 254 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1958); Well Serv., Ltd.
v. Pyramid Derrick & Equip. Corp., 526 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.
Tex. 1981); Applied Polymers of Am. v. Wright Water-
proofing Co., 608 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1980); Plains
Bag & Bagging Co. v. Golby Bag Co., 643 S.W.2d 509
(Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Modine Mfg. Co. v. North East
Independent School Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974); Custom Textiles, Inc. v, Crown Sample Book Co.,
472 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); and Gray Co. v.
Ward, 145 S.W,2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); cf. N. K.
Parrish, Inc. v. Schrimscher, 516 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974). Mere interstate delivery, however, is tradition-
ally not enough. Street & Smith Publications, Inc. v. Spikes,
120 F.2d 895 (5th Cir, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 653
(1941); Computer Synergy Corp. v. Business Sys. Prods.,
Inc., 582 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); and Bodzin
v. Regal Accessories, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967); see also Sun-X Int'l. Co. v. Wirt, 413 S.W.2d 761
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967). The underlying issues are discussed
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in Kurth, Adjudicative Resolution of Commercial Disputes
Between Nationals of the United States and Mexico, 14 St.
Mary's L.J. 597 (1983); and Bishop, International Litigation
in Texas: Service of Process and Jurisdiction, 35 Sw. L.J.
1013 (1982).
Strategy II: The export subsidiary limits its exposure to
inconvenient litigation by providing, in its commercial con-
tracts, for the arbitration of disputes.
Comment:
Private contract disputes are one of the rare Mexico-U.S.
problem areas in which there is a helpful treaty relationship
between the two countries. Both adhere to the U.N. Arbi-
tration Convention of 1958 (Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, T.I.A.S. No. 4739, 33 U.N.T.S. 3), and thus are
reciprocally obligated to enforce agreements to arbitrate and
to recognize arbitration awards. This permits parties to
require, by carefully drawn arbitration clauses, that disputes
arising under their commercial contracts be resolved exclu-
sively by arbitration.
(c) Problem: Product liability
Strategy: The export subsidiary obtains, or requires its dis-
tributors to obtain, product liability insurance protecting
both the export subsidiary and its Mexican manufacturing
parent.
Comment:
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) the U.S. Supreme Court established the principle that
a court has jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who
has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980), that principle was applied in dictum to product
liability suits against a non-resident manufacturer or distrib-
utor "that delivers its products into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that they will be purchased by consum-
ers in the forum State." Id. at 298.
In Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of
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California, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (plurality opinion), the
Court confronted a more complex situation. There the plain-
tiff was injured in California while riding a motorcycle
whose rear tire was manufactured in Taiwan incorporating
a valve assembly manufactured by Asahi in Japan. The
plaintiff brought a product liability suit against (among
others) the Taiwanese prime manufacturer, who impleaded
Asahi by cross-complaint. Pending trial on the merits, the
plaintiff settled, dismissing the main suit but leaving the
cross-complaint, which the California Supreme Court held
separately justiciable in California. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed. A majority of the justices reached that conclusion
on the reasoning that in the context of dismissal of the
plaintiff's case it would be "unreasonable" to require non-
resident Asahi to defend in California a cross-complaint by
the non-resident defendant. Three justices also joined Justice
O'Connor's separate conclusion that, regardless of the dis-
missal of the plaintiff's case, the facts did not support
California jurisdiction over Asahi because there was no
proof of "any action by Asahi to purposefully avail itself
of the California market," as Asahi "did not create, control
or employ the distribution system that brought its valves to
California" (Id. at 1033).
In the view of those four justices, therefore, there is a
penumbra of jurisdictional immunity for foreign sub-man-
ufacturers who have no direct distribution system in the
U.S. For them as well as direct exporters, however, insurance
is the only reliable precaution against U.S. product liability
claims.
2. Objective: Protect the name-identification of the exported prod-
uct in the United States.
(a) Problem: Pirating in the U.S. of a product's publicly-
accepted Mexican trademark.
Strategy: The Mexican manufacturer anticipates its prospec-
tive need for product name-protection in the U.S. market
by applying, at the earliest possible date, for registration of
a U.S. (state or federal) trademark.
Comment:
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The duration of a U.S. (federal) trademark is twenty -years
but it may be renewed indefinitely. The initial application
requires evidence of prior use in U.S. (interstate or foreign)
commerce and may be cancelled at the end of six years if
the registrant does not show continued use in U.S. commerce
or circumstances excusing non-use. Each renewal application
requires evidence of current use in U.S. commerce. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1058, 1059 (1982).
3. Objective: Minimize U.S. (federal) income taxes.
(a) Problem: The absence of a general Mexico-U.S. income tax
treaty.
Strategy: The Mexican manufacturing enterprise structures
its exports in accordance with the tax-liability criteria of the
U.S. Internal Revenue Code and Regulations.
Comment:
Income tax treaties now in force between the U.S. and other
countries lessen the U.S. income tax burden on those coun-
tries' exports to the U.S. and smooth some rough edges of
export structuring.
The tax burden is lessened by reducing tax withholding rates
on dividends from U.S.-corporation export structures and
by eliminating tax withholding on dividends from foreign-
corporation export structures that operate within the U.S.
Depending on a treaty's vintage, it may also eliminate some
applications of the "dividend equivalent" tax discussed in
Section 3(c) below.
The structural smoothing results from substituting the treaty
tax-liability criteria of "industrial and commercial profits"
and "permanent establishment" for the statutory tax-liabil-
ity criteria of "effectively connected" income and U.S.
"trade or business," discussed in Section 3(b) below.
Treaties also reduce tax withholding rates on interest and
royalties paid abroad, and relax the statutory criteria of
U.S. personal tax liability applied to the exporter's foreign
consultants and trainees. Article 6(7) of the Japan-U.S.
Income Tax Treaty (Convention for the Avoidance of Dou-
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ble Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Mar. 8,
1971 United States-Japan, 23 U.S.T. 981, T.I.A.S. No.
7365), for example, also adds the helpful rule that income
from the purchase and sale of personal property is sourced
where the property is "sold."
There being no general income tax treaty between Mexico
and the U.S., the Mexican exporter faces the undiminished
tax rates and unameliorated tax-liability criteria of the In-
ternal Revenue Code and Regulations.
(b) Problem: U.S. statutory tax-liability criteria for export in-
come generally.
Strategy: The Mexican manufacturing/exporting enterprise
is structured and operated in such manner that only the
special-purpose export subsidiary, and not the Mexican man-
ufacturing parent, has income "effectively connected" with
"the conduct of a trade or business" in the U.S.
Comment:
The U.S. Internal Revenue Code contains no separate def-
inition of taxable export- income. Instead the exporter must
find his tax-identity in the generalized role of a recipient of
income "effectively connected" with "the conduct of a trade
or business" in the U.S. I.R.C. § 882(a)(1) (West Supp.
1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(b) (as amended 1984); id. §
1.864-2(e) (1966).
In principle the exporter's income from sources outside the
U.S. is not taxed. I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
But see id. § 864(c)(4)(B)-(C).
There are allocation rules for income from manufacture
outside, and sale by the manufacturer within, the U.S.
Treas. Reg. § 1.863(b)(2) (1977).
Even if the exporter has an office in the U.S., income is not
attributed to that office unless the office is regularly used for
business, is a "material factor" in producing the income, and
"regularly" conducts activities of the type that produces the
income. I.R.C. § 864(c)(5)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-6(b) (as
amended 1983); id. § 1.864-7(a)-(b) (1972).
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The office of a U.S. agent is not attributed to the exporter unless
(1) the agent either (a) has, and regularly exercises, authority
to conclude contracts on behalf of the exporter or (b) has a
stock of goods from which the agent regularly fills orders on
the exporter's behalf, and (2) the agent is not "a general com-
mission agent, broker or other agent of independent status
-acting in the ordinary course of [the] business." IR.C.
§ 864(c)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-7(d) (1972).
(c) Problem: The "dividend equivalent" tax.
Strategy: As a general rule, the Mexican manufacturing/
exporting enterprise incorporates its special-purpose export
subsidiary in the U.S.
Comment:
Before 1987 the U.S. was one of the few nations that taxed
dividends paid abroad by domestic corporations to foreign
shareholders but did not impose a corresponding tax on the
remittance abroad of the profits of domestic branches of
foreign corporations. That anomalous situation, and the
"second tier dividend tax" that attempted to reach benefi-
ciaries of the remittance hiatus, is described in Murphy, The
Legal Dimension of Exporting to the United States, in
Private investors Abroad 229, 236-37 (1984). For Mexican
exporters (whose rate of U.S. dividend tax withholding is
not reduced by a general income tax treaty with the U.S.),
the result was to favor the use of the U.S. branch of a
foreign corporation, rather than a U.S. corporation, as a
special-purpose subsidiary for export distribution within the
U.S.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ended the anomaly. Now the
U.S, has a remittance tax, with a vengeance. Instead of
being taxed on branch profits as and when remitted, foreign
corporations with branches in the U.S. are taxed on the
"dividend equivalent amount for the taxable year" (I.R.C.
§ 884 (West Supp. 1987))-in effect, an annual tax on
remittable branch profits.
For the Mexican manufacturing enterprise the result is to
reverse the pre-1987 structural rtle-of-thumb. Absent excep-
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tional facts, in terms of net current U.S. income taxes it is
now usually more advantageous to structure its special-
purpose subsidiary for export distribution in the U.S. as a
U.S. corporation, not as the U.S. branch of a foreign
corporation.
(d) Problem: Mexican income tax rates.
Strategy: In structuring exports to the U.S., the Mexican
manufacturing/exporting enterprise bears in mind that in-
come shifted from the U.S. to Mexico is in principle income
taxed at a higher rate.
Comment:
A central feature of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to
convert the U.S. from a moderately high income tax juris-
diction to one of the lowest among developed countries.
The comparison with current Mexican rates is striking.
Under the Act the ultimate U.S. tax rates on top-bracket
1987 income are 28% for individuals and 34% for corpo-
rations. Although Mexican income tax rates are scheduled
for reduction, for top-bracket 1987 income they are 60.5%
(including surtax) for individuals and 48.65% for corpora-
tions. Diamond, Foreign Tax and Trade Briefs, Release No.
332.
Notwithstanding enormous differences between the U.S. and
Mexican tax systems in the calculation, reporting, and col-
lection of net income, the present disparity in rates makes
it obvious that, in structuring Mexican exports to the U.S.,
tax planning now must accomplish more than merely shifting
income from the U.S. to Mexico.
Some structures will seek to defer Mexican taxes by the
accumulation and reinvestment of export profits in U.S.
export subsidiaries; others will achieve deferral and rein-
vestment outside the U.S. by interposing a tax haven holding
company between the U.S. export subsidiary and the Mex-
ican manufacturing parent. Other structural possibilities are
innumerable. But, however the problem is solved, for the
Mexican exporter effective overall tax planning no longer
ends with merely reducing the amount of income that is
subject to U.S. income taxes.
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4. Objective: Minimize state taxes and registration requirements.
(a) Problem: State "Certificate of Authority" statutes.
Example: Texas Business Corporation Act, art. 8.01A (Ver-
non 1980).
Strategy: The Mexican manufacturing parent avoids all ac-
tivity in the U.S., particularly acts that constitute "trans-
acting business" for purposes of the "Certificate of
Authority" statute of any state. Only the export subsidiary
performs acts that could constitute "transacting business"
for such purposes.
As regards a state in which the export subsidiary does not
intend to obtain a Certificate of Authority, the export
subsidiary avoids all activity in that state except acts which
do not constitute "transacting business" for such purposes.
The export subsidiary carefully chooses the states in which
it will obtain a Certificdte of Authority. To the extent
business logistics permit, it selects those states on the basis
of their low consequent taxes and registration fees.
Comment:
Many states (including Texas, whose "Certificate of Au-
thority" statute is cited above) consider as not "transacting
business" for Certificate of Authority purposes such local
acts as: Maintaining bank accounts; effecting sales through
independent contractors; creating, securing, and collecting
debts; transacting any business in interstate commerce; and
conducting isolated transactions.
By analogy to interstate sales, Texas precedents offer Mex-
ican exporters considerable leeway to sell into Texas without
obtaining a local Certificate of Authority. Thus, it does not
constitute "transacting business" in Texas for a seller out-
side the state to sell goods by interstate shipment into Texas
pursuant to purchase orders that were obtained in Texas by
the seller's representative and sent to the seller for accep-
tance outside Texas. Waggener Paint Co. v. Paint Distrib.,
Inc., 228 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1956); North v. Mergenthaler
Linotype Co., 77 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
* 107
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Southern Discount Co. v. Rose, 296 S.W. 482 (Tex. Com.
App. 1927); and see Kimball-Krough Pump Co. v. Judd,
88 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Com. App. 1935). Consignment sales
from outside Texas are similarly exempt, apparently on the
theory that the intrastate activity is that of the consignee
and the sale made by the consignor is in interstate commerce.
Truhe Box Co. v. Jandrew, 346 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961); Southwest Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nunn Elec. Co.,
283 S.W. 781 (Tex. Com. App. 1926); and Falls Rubber
Co. v. La Fon, 256 S.W. 577 (Tex. Com. App. 1923).
Similarly, a manufacturer's role in arranging both a sale in
interstate commerce to its Texas distributor and the distri-
butor's intrastate resale to a Texas resident does not con-
stitute "transacting business" in Texas on the manufacturer's
part. Erwin v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., 156
S.W. 1097 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
As discussed in Section 4(b) below, holding a Certificate of
Authority in a state may itself necessitate payment of fran-
chise tax in that state.
(b) Problem: State franchise taxes.
Example: Texas Tax Code Section 171.001; Texas Franchise
Tax Rules Section 3.406.
Strategy: The Mexican manufacturing parent avoids all ac-
tivity in the U.S., particularly acts that constitute "doing
business" for purposes of franchise tax in any state. Only
the export subsidiary performs acts that could constitute
"doing business" for such purposes.
As regards a state in which the export subsidiary does not
intend to pay franchise tax, the export subsidiary avoids all
activity in that state except acts which do not constitute
"doing business" for such purposes.
The export subsidiary carefully chooses in advance the states
in which its operations will be such as to necessitate paying
franchise tax. To the extent business logistics permit, it
selects those states on the basis of low consequent taxes and
registration fees.
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If a state's franchise tax statute provides (as does the Texas
statute cited above) that having a Certificate of Authority
in that state is sufficient to require a foreign corporation
to pay local franchise tax, that tax cost is weighed in
determining whether to schedule for that state operations
of the export subsidiary that would necessitate obtaining a
Certificate of Authority.
Comment:
Specifying what constitutes "doing business" for franchise
tax purposes is frequently left to regulations or administra-
tive implementation as distinguished from statute.
In Texas, for instance, the statute merely provides that
franchise tax is imposed on "each corporation that does
business in this state or that is ... authorized to do business
in this state." No published administrative interpretation
has applied that language to foreign "destination sales"
into Texas.
Rulings in analogous interstate cases support the proposition
that such sales constitute "doing business" for franchise
tax purposes if they are based on consignment or regular
solicitation by sales representatives within the state, but not
if they are made by mail solicitation from outside or no
solicitation at all. Op. Tex. Atty. Gen. No. M-642 (1970);
Tex. Comp. Adm. Dec. No. 10,561 (1980); and Tex. Comp.
Adm. Dec. No. 10,178 (1981).
According to the Texas Franchise Rules, specific activities
of foreign corporations that constitute "doing business" in
Texas for franchise purposes include: "Performance of a
contract in Texas" (Texas Franchise Tax Rules § 3.406(c)(1));
"Having employees, independent contractors, agents, or
other representatives in Texas, regardless whether they reside
in Texas, to provide or induce sales of the foreign corpor-
ation's goods or services" (Id. § 3.406(c)(4)); and consigning
goods to Texas (Id. § 3.406(c)(17)). Most sweeping of all is
Section 3.406(b): "A corporation is doing business in Texas,
for purposes of [franchise tax]i when it has constitutional
nexus with Texas for the purpose of franchise taxation."
The result is to extend asserted franchise tax jurisdiction
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over Mexican exporters to the constitutional limits discussed
in Section 4(c) below.
(c) Problem: State taxes generally.
Strategy: Similar to Section 4(b) above.
Comment:
The authority of U.S. states to tax exports to the U.S. is a
function of article 1, Section 8 of the United States Con-
stitution (authorizing Congress to tax imports and to regulate
foreign commerce); article 1, Section 10 (forbidding states,
without the consent of Congress, to tax imports "except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
laws"); and the tenth amendment (reserving to the states
"or to the people" all powers the Constitution neither
delegates to the federal government nor prohibits to the
states).
The leading cases are Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419
(1827) (a state may not require importers to obtain a license
for the sale of imported goods in the original package); Low
v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29 (1871) (a state may not tax imported
goods held by an importer in the original package); Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (a state may
impose a non-discriminatory tax on all goods, imported or
domestic, that are no longer in transit and are warehoused
within the state); and Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (a state may not tax cargo
containers that are registered and used exclusively for foreign
commerce but are located temporarily in the state in transit
or awaiting cargo). They are discussed in Murphy, The
Legal Dimension of Exporting to the United States, in
Private Investors Abroad 229, 241-43 (1984). See also the
discussion of unitary taxes in Section 4(d) below.
(d) Problem: State "unitary" taxes.
Strategy: Both the Mexican manufacturing parent and the
export subsidiary avoid all activity in a state that imposes
a "unitary" tax, unless the Mexican manufacturing/export-
ing enterprise is willing, in principle, to subject its overall
operations to the global reporting and allocation procedures
that the unitary tax requires.
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If the enterprise accepts those procedures in principle, before
commencing operations in a "unitary" tax state, the enter-
prise carefully weighs the resulting cost, both in taxes and
in additional accounting procedures necessary for compli-
ance. If those costs are acceptable the enterprise proceeds
as described in Section 4(b) above.
Comment:
By "unitary" taxation a state, in taxing the income of a
corporation or affiliated group that operates partly within
and partly without the state, allocates a portion of the
worldwide income of that corporation or group as being
taxable within the state.
The authority of U.S. states to impose "unitary" taxes is
a function of the provisions of the U.S. Constitution men-
tioned in Section 4(c) above, plus the due process clause of
its fourteenth amendment (forbidding states to "deprive any
person of ... property, without due process of law").
The leading cases are Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State
Tax Com., 266 U.S. 271 (1924) (a state may tax a single
foreign corporation, operating within and without the state,
on the basis of a reasonable allocation of its worldwide
income), Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 425
(1980) (a state may tax a parent corporation, operating
directly and through subsidiaries within and without the
state, on the basis of the parent corporation's worldwide
income, including dividends from subsidiaries not operating
within the taxing state), and Container Corporation of
American v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (a
state may tax a parent corporation, operating directly and
through subsidiaries as in Mobil, on the basis of a reason-
able allocation of the worldwide income of the parent and
all subsidiaries, in the latter case whether distributed as a
dividend to the parent or not).
At the peak of the "unitary" tax movement one estimator
counted 24 states that taxed on some allocated basis, in-
cluding 12 (Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Utah) that imposed worldwide allo-
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cation of the type considered in Container Corporation
(Investment/USA, Nov. 1983, at 3). By October 1986, the
ensuing consternation of foreign exporters to, and investors
in, the U.S. had reduced that 12 to three: Alaska, Montana
and North Dakota. Investment/USA, Oct. 1986, at 14. The
remaining nine had scaled back their extraterritorial fiscal
assertions to systems that tax a transnational business only
from the "water's edge" of its local operations.
Even for the nine states with "water's edge" systems,
however, controversy still rages. The "water's edge" system
of California has been criticized by officials of the U.S.
Treasury as discriminatory against U.S.-owned corporations
that operate abroad, and bills have been introduced in the
U.S. Congress to correct the disparity. Meanwhile, in Bar-
clays Bank Int'l TC v. Franchise Tax Board (No. 325059,
Sacramento County Superior Court) a California trial court
held California's pre-reform "unitary" tax to be unconsti-
tutional, a ruling that if finally reviewed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court may rank with Bass, Mobil and Container
Corporation as a delineator of the limits imposed by the
U.S. Constitution on the extraterritorial taxing power of
states. See Zak, California Superior Court Strikes Down
Unitary Method for Foreign-Based Multinationals, Invest-
ment/USA, August 1987, at 8.
5. Objective: Organize the pattern of export and distribution in a
manner that will maximize the success of the Mexican product
in the relevant U.S. market.
(a) Problem: U.S. antitrust laws.
Strategy: In structuring its pattern of export to, and distri-
bution within, the U.S. market, the Mexican enterprise
carefully anticipates the requirements of U.S. antitrust laws.
Comment:
Exports to the United States are covered, directly or indi-
rectly, by "each of the three basic U.S. antitrust statutes.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce... with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits
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"unfair methods of competition" in "commerce," which is
defined to include "commerce ... with foreign nations."
15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45 (1982). Section 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits the corporate acquisition of shares or assets of a
corporation where "in any line of commerce in any section
of the country the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly," "commerce" again being defined to include
"trade or commerce ... with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12, 18 (1982).
The Wilson Tariff Act also prohibits combinations or con-
spiracies of exporters to restrict competition or to increase
the price of imported goods or their end products. 15 U.S.C.
§ 8 (1982). Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Amend-
ments to the Clayton Act (price discrimination) and Section
3 of the Clayton Act (exclusive dealing and tying arrange-
ments) apply to all transactions, including exports, in which
the goods are sold "for use, consumption or resale in the
United States." 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 14 (1982).
Contrary to the holding in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1908), it is now clear that acfs
committed outside the United States may be actionable
under the U.S. antitrust laws. Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v.
Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 .F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); and
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,
1970 Trade Cases (CCII) 73,069 (D.Del. 1970).
Among the leading antitrust cases that involved exports to
the United States are: Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (Sherman Act); United States
v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (Sherman Act);
United Staies v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927)
(Sherman Act and Wilson Tariff Act); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (Sherman Act);
and United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 253 F. Supp.
129 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (Clayton Act), aff'd 385 U.S. 37
(1966), reh'g denied 385 U.S. 1021 (1967).
In a 1977 statement of policy, the Antitrust Division of the
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U.S. Department of Justice stated that, to be actionable
under the U.S. antitrust laws, conduct outside the U.S. must
have a "substantial and foreseeable effect" on U.S. com-
merce. United States Dep't. of Justice, Antitrust Guide for
International Operations 6 (1977). Once inside the U.S.
market, the exported goods are subject to the same antitrust
constraints as goods of domestic origin. Typically those
constraints involve issues of exclusive distributorship, tying,
resale price maintenance, and territorial and customer res-
trictions. The current enforcement policy of the Antitrust
Division on those subjects is stated in the United States
Dep't. of Justice, Vertical Restraints Guidelines (1985).
(b) Problem: U.S. Antidumping Duties (19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-
1673g; 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.0-.70).
Strategy: In determining whether to enter the U.S. market,
the Mexican enterprise carefully compares, in terms of the
U.S. antidumping law, the intended U.S. market price and
the actual Mexican (or other relevant) market value of the
product it proposes to export.
Comment:
The U.S. antidumping law imposes offsetting duties on an
imported product if (1) the U.S. price of the imported
product is lower than its foreign market value and (2) as a
result of such imports a U.S. industry sustains, or is threat-
ened with, material injury, or the establishment of a U.S.
industry is materially retarded.
The U.S. antidumping law is of particular concern to Mex-
ican exporters because, after many decades of high protec-
tive tariffs, the Mexican market price of many capital-
intensive manufactured products is higher than the going
price of similar products in the United States.
A helpful summary of U.S. antidumping law, countervailing
duties law, and other import penalties is contained in San-
dIer, Primer on United States Trade Remedies, 19 Int'l Law.
761 (1985).
(c) Problem: U.S. Countervailing Duties (19 U.S.C. §§ 1303,
1671-1671h; 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.0-.51).
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Strategy: In determining'whether to enter the U.S. market
the Mexican enterprise carefully considers the extent to
which the product it proposes to export would be considered
to have benefited from Mexican government subsidies that
are dutiable under the U.S. countervailing duties law.
Comment:
The U.S. countervailing duties law imposes offsetting duties
on imports. To impose such duties it must be established,
in all cases, that the import benefited from a dutiable foreign
government subsidy. In the case of imports from a country
that belongs, or is assimilated, to the subsidies code of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) it must
also be shown that as a result of such import a U.S. industry
sustains, or is threatened with, material injury, or that the
establishment of a U.S. industry is materially retarded.
There are, in fact, two statutory impositions of U.S. coun-
tervailing duties. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982), which applies to
imports from "a country under the Agreement" (i.e., a
country that belongs, or is assimilated, to the GATT sub-
sidies code), requires proof of a "material injury" as well
as a dutiable subsidy. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982), which applies
to imports from all other countries, only requires proof of
a dutiable subsidy.
On April 23, 1985, Mexico and the United States signed an
agreement whereby for a three-year period Mexico will be
accorded the status of a "country under the Agreement"
for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1671. For its part Mexico
agreed to discontinue specified forms of subsidies and, in
general, committed itself to obligations similar to the GATT
subsidies code. 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 565,
590-92 (1985).
On August 24, 1986, Mexico became the 92nd Contracting
Party to GATT, undertaking to "initiate negotiations" to-
ward adherence to the GATT subsidies code and to phase
into other GATT codes over a period of years. 9 Business
America (October 13, 1986).
The high degree of government intervention in the Mexican
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economy tends to make Mexican products vulnerable to
claims for countervailing duties. Of more than twenty Mex-
ican government programs that were involved in U.S. coun-
tervailing duty investigations between 1982 and 1984, eleven
(typically loans, credits, tax rebates and supplier discounts
favoring exports) were held to be dutiable.
(d) Problem: Section 337 exclusion. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp.
11 1984); 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-.71 (1987) (adjudicative pro-
cedures); Id. §§ 211.01-.59 (1987) (enforcement procedures).
Strategy: In determining whether to introduce a particular
product into the U.S. market, the Mexican enterprise care-
fully considers the vulnerability of the product to exclusion
under Section 337.
Comment:
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1982)) mandates the exclusion of articles that are
"concerned" with "[u]nfair methods of competition and
unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United
States, or in their sale ... the effect or tendency of which
is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently
and economically operated in the United States, or to pre-
vent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain
or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States."
Enforcement cases have construed Section 337 as covering
antitrust violations; the infringement of patents, trademarks
and copyrights; false advertising; and "palming off."
(e) Problem: U.S. (federal and state) franchise and business
opportunity laws.
Strategy: In appointing U.S. distributors and dealers, the
export subsidiary carefully anticipates the disclosure require-
ments and supra-contractual obligations that apply to the
offering of a "franchise" or "business opportunity" in
particular jurisdictions.
Comment:
The U.S. government and nearly forty states regulate prod-
uct distribution arrangements. Some laws apply only to the
distribution of specific products (for example, automobiles
1988 / Structuring Mexican Exports to the United States
or gasoline). Other laws focus on the nature of the rela-
tionship, typically regulating only those that meet statutory
definitions of "franchise" or "business opportunity."
The principal regulatory mechanisms are (1) requiring the
offeror to disclose information concerning the offeror and
the relationship offered and (2) granting the offeree special
supra-contractual rights, such as protection against termi-
nation on short notice or without "good cause."
The general federal regulation is the Franchise Rule (Disclo-
sure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising
and Business Opportunity Ventures, 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1-.3
(1987)) administered by the Federal Trade Commission. It
does not regulate the parties' business relationship, but
requires a franchiser to disclose to the franchisee detailed
information concerning the franchiser and the franchise.
For the Mexican exporter, the key to compliance with such
regulations is determining, in each instance, whether the
planned distribution relationship falls within a regulated
category. In the case of regulation by product line, the form
of distribution may be irrelevant. In the case of regulation
by relationship, the form of distribution as entailing more
than a mere agreement to purchase for resale is usually the key.
6. Objective: Clear U.S. Customs.
(a) Problem: Normal import duties.
Strategy: The export subsidiary carefully ascertains, in
advance, the optimum duty classification available for the pro-
duct it proposes to export.
Comment:
The best technique is to prepare, with the help of an experienced
customs broker, mock-ups of the commercial documents and
U.S. Customs forms that will be required to see the product
into the U.S. Doubtful cases can be resolved by consultation
with, and advisory opinions from, U.S. Customs. What is indis-
pensable is for the exporter to reckon import duty as a significant
cost of doing business in the U.S., and to determine the accept-
able classification that achieves the lowest available duty rate.
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The U.S. is approaching a sea change in its method of classi-
fying goods for customs purposes. On August 2, 1986, the
U.S. Treasury Department gave notice that the U.S. intended
to replace the venerable U.S. Tariff Schedules by acceding
to the International Convention on the Harmonized System,
subject to ratification by the U.S. Congress, effective January
1, 1988. 51 Federal Register 30933.
The Harmonized System was developed by the Customs Coop-
eration Council over a twelve-year period and is based in large
part on the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. The major coun-
tries that did not adhere to the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature
were the U.S., Canada, North Korea, East Germany, and the
U.S.S.R. The International Convention on the Harmonized
System was opened for signature on 1 July 1983 and was sche-
duled to enter into force on 1 January 1988. It has now been
signed (in most cases subject to ratification) by more than
fifty countries and customs unions, including most European
nations, Canada, and Japan.
The origin and development of the Harmonized System is
discussed in Torrence, New Tariff Code Streamlines Global
Trading System, Business America, November 23, 1987, at 2.
(b) Problem: Exclusionary laws enforced by U.S. Customs.
Strategy: The export subsidiary makes certain, in advance,
that the product and packaging it intends to export are not
subject to exclusion for non-duty reasons.
Comment:
In addition to collecting import duty, U.S. Customs has a
myriad of exclusionary chores. A proposed export may be
excluded because it is not marked to show country origin
(19 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. 11 1984); 19 C.F.R. §§ 134.0-.55
(1987)) or because the marking is false as to origin or
description (15 U.S.C. §§ 294, 1125 (1982); 19 C.F.R. §
11.13 (1987)). Goods bearing counterfeit U.S. trademarks
may be seized and forfeited (15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982); 19
C.F.R. §§ 133.1-.24 (1987)), as may pirated copies of U.S.-
copyrighted works (17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. III 1985); 19
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C.F.R. §§ 133.31-.44 (1987)) and goods involving customs
fraud generally (19 U.S.C. § 1592 (Supp. II 1984)).
See also Section 5(d) above (Section 337 exclusion).

